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Abstract. This study examines BDI logics in the context of Gabbay’s fibring
semantics. We show that dovetailing (a special form of fibring) can be adopted as
a semantic methodology to combine BDI logics. We develop a set of interaction
axioms that can capture static as well as dynamic aspects of the mental states in
BDI systems, using Catach’s incestual schema Ga,b,c,d . Further we exemplify the
constraints required on fibring function to capture the semantics of interactions
among modalities. The advantages of having a fibred approach is discussed in the
final section.
1 Introduction
BDI based Agent-systems [1,7,4] have been well studied in the AI literature. The de-
sign of these systems hinges on mental attitudes like beliefs (B), desires (D) (or goals
(G)) and intentions (I). The formalization of these three mental attitudes and their inter-
actions have been captured to a great extend using Multi-Modal Logics (e.g., [15,17,3]).
Moreover, some additional operators likeCapability,Opportunity,Obligation [12,13,16]
and several action constructs [18] have been introduced to improve the expressive power
of the logics involved.
Much of the research in BDI is focused on improving the expressive power of the
language with single operators and identifying formal properties of each of them. How-
ever, the general methodology for combining the different logics involved has been
mainly neglected. For instance, any BDI system modelling rational agents consists of
a combined system of logics of knowledge, belief, time and modal logic of actions.
Each of these combined systems was presented and motivated by a different author
for different reasons and different applications. We believe that investigating a gen-
eral methodology for combining the component logics involved in BDI-like systems is
an important research issue. This would result in a better understanding of the formal
groundings of complex rational agent architectures and enable the designer to elegantly
and easily incorporate new features of rational agency within her framework. Moreover
the proposed general methodology should permit a modular treatment of the modal
components, whereby, each component is analysed and developed on its own, with the
most appropriate methodology for it, and is then reused in the combination. Further-
more each module has its own features but the framework remains unchanged among
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the combined systems. Finally the combined system should offer preservation of some
important logical properties of its elements.
In this study we investigate one such method, viz. fibring [5], and use it to recon-
struct the logical account of BDI in terms of dovetailing (a special case of fibring)
together with the multi-modal semantics of Catach [2]. In doing so we identify a set of
interaction axioms for BDI, based on the incestual schema Ga,b,c,d , which covers many
of the existing BDI axioms and also make possible the generation of a large class of
new ones. Further we identify conditions under which completeness transfers from the
component logics (L1 and L2) to their fibred/dovetailed composition (LF1,2/L
D
1,2), with
the help of canonical model structures. We also show completeness preservation in the
case of interaction axiom of the form 21α ⇒ 22α (LF,D1,2 ⊕21α ⇒ 22α). Our study
differs from that of other combining techniques like fusion in terms of the interaction
axiom. For instance, normal bimodal and polymodal logics without any interaction ax-
ioms are well-studied as fusions of normal monomodal logics in [19]. Property transfer
for such logics has been dealt with in [9]. For a slightly different account on fusions of
logics one can refer [11]. Moreover fusions of normal modal logics without interaction
axioms is the same as dovetailing. But difficulty arises with the extra interaction axiom.
Then we need a more general concept like fibring. Our study starts with the assump-
tion that the combination of two complete logics need not be complete when we add
interaction axioms [8]. We want to identify conditions under which completeness can
be preserved when we include interaction axioms like above.
2 BDI & Multi-Modal Logics
The main advantage of using Multi-Modal Logics in BDI is their ability to express
complex modalities, that can capture the inter-relationships existing among the different
mental attitudes. This can be achieved by either composing modal operators of different
types, or by using formal operations over modalities.
For instance the idea that an agent’s goal is always supported by its belief is captured
by the following BDI axioms:
GOALKD(α)⇒ BELKD45(α) (1)
GOALKD(α)⇒ BELKD45(GOALKD(α)) (2)
The axiom systems for each of the mental operators is written as a superscript and the
justification for such a preference is given in [15]. For a further account of the different
axiom systems and the semantics for BDI logics refer to [15]; accordingly the semantic
conditions for (1) and (2) are:
if (wx,wy) ∈ BEL then (wx,wy) ∈ GOAL (3)
if (wx,wy) ∈ BEL and (wy,wz) ∈ GOAL then (wx,wz) ∈ GOAL (4)
Condition (3) captures inclusion (containment) of a binary relation for beliefs in
the relation for goals, whereas (4) captures the combined transitivity on two binary
relations R1 and R2. The above mentioned axioms and conditions together with a range
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of additional axioms and constructs characterizes a typical BDI system. The properties
of soundness, completeness etc are defined via canonical Kripke structures and for a
further account see [14]
The point here is that the axiom systems for GOAL and BEL is a combination of
other axiom systems and hence they are different. They can be considered as two dif-
ferent languages L1 and L2 with 21 (BEL) and 22 (GOAL) built up from the respective
sets A1 and A2 of atoms and supported by the logics KD45 and KD. Hence we are
dealing with two different systems S1 and S2 characterized, respectively, by the class of
Kripke modelsK1 andK2 and this fact should be taken into consideration while defin-
ing semantic conditions for interaction axioms like those given above. For instance, we
know how to evaluate21α (BEL(α)) inK1 (KD45) and22α (GOAL(α)) inK2 (KD).
We need a method for evaluating 21 (resp. 22) with respect toK2 (resp.K1).
The problem in its general form is how to construct a multi-modal logic containing
several unary modalities, each coming with its own system of specific axioms. The
fibring technique introduced in the next section allows one to combine systems through
their semantics. The fibring function can evaluate (give a yes/no) answer with respect
to a modality in S2, being in S1 and vice versa. Each time we have to evaluate a formula
α of the form 22β in a world in a model ofK1 we associate, via the fibring function F,
to the world a model inK2 where we calculate the truth value of the formula. Formally
w |=m∈K1 22β iff F2(w) |=m′∈K2 22β
α holds in w iff it holds in the model associated to w through the fibring function F.
Moreover α could be a mixed wff consisting of operators from L1 and L2 (for instance
α can be3122q). This is possible because the axiom systems of BEL and GOAL itself
are combined systems. Then we have to say that the wff α belongs to the language
L(1,2). The existing BDI semantics fails to give adequate explanation for such formu-
las. The problem becomes even more complex when we allow the system to vary in
time. Then we have to combine the BDI system with a suitable temporal logic. The
fibring/dovetailing technique provides a general methodology for such combinations as
shown in the next section.
It is also important to note that since each mental operator (BEL, GOAL) itself is
a combination of different axiom systems, the underlying multi-modal language (LBDI)
should be such that we should be able to develop each single operator on its own within
its own semantics so that in the later stage the operators and models can be glued to-
gether through fibring/dovetailing to form a comprehensive system. The multi-modal
language should also be able to express multiple concepts like rational agents, actions,
plans etc. The problem with the existing BDI-Language is that each time we want to
incorporate a new concept we have to redefine the system and come up with characteri-
zation results. For instance, if we want to capture the notion of actions, plans, programs
etc. in BDI, we need to come up with specific axiom systems for each of them and then
show that they are characterized within the system. What we need is a set of interaction
axioms that can generate a range of multi-modal systems for which there is a general
characterization theorem so that we could avoid the need for showing it each time a
new system is considered. To this end we adopt the class of interaction axioms Ga,b,c,d
of Catach [2] that can account for a range of multi-modal systems.
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3 Fibring of Modal Logics
In this section we present a general semantic methodology, called fibring, for combining
modal (BDI) logics and a variant of it called dovetailing. Two theorems stating relation-
ships between dovetailing and BDI logics and dovetailing and fibring are shown. It is
shown that the existing BDI logic is a dovetailed system.
The Fibring methodology allows one to combine systems through their semantics.
The method helps in combining arbitrary logical systems in a uniform way and gives
a new insight on possible worlds semantics [5,6]. Its idea is essentially to replace the
notion of a possible world as a unit by another Kripke structure. For instance, if we con-
sider the earlier example of a mixed formula, α =3122q, the way the fibring function
works can be shown as follows. α can be considered as a formula of L1 (as the outer
connective is 31). From the point of view of language L1 this formula has the form
31p, where p=22q is atomic since L1 does not recognize 22. The satisfaction condi-
tion for31p can be given considering a modelm1 = (S1,R1,a1,h1) such that a1 |=31p
(where S1 is the set of possible worlds, a1 ∈ S is the actual world and R ⊆ S×S is the
accessibility relation, h is the assignment function, a binary function, giving a value
h(t, p) ∈ {0,1} for any t ∈ S and atomic p). For this to hold there should be some t ∈ S1
such that a1R1t, and we have t |=1 p, i.e., t |=1 22q. Since 22 is not in the language of
L1 the normal evaluation is not possible. The basic idea of fibring is to associate with
each t ∈ S1, a modelm2t = (S2t ,R2t ,a2t ,h2t ) of L2 and by evaluating 22q in the associated
model, thus we have
t |=1 22q iff a2t |=2 22q.
If we take F1 to be the fibring function associating the modelmt2 with t then F
1(t) =mt2
and the semantics for the languageL(1,2) has a model of the form (S1,R1,a1,h1,F1).
Fibring two semantics Let I be a set of labels representing intentional states, and
Li, i ∈ I be modal logics whose respective modalities are 2i, i ∈ I.
Definition 1 [5] A fibred model is a structure (W,S,R,a,h,τ,F) where
– W is a set of possible worlds;
– S is a function giving for each w a set of possible worlds, Sw ⊆W;
– R is a function giving for each w, a relation Rw ⊆ Sw×Sw;
– a is a function giving the actual world aw of the model labelled by w;
– h is an assignment function hw(q)⊆ Sw, for each atomic q;
– τ is the semantical identifying function τ :W → I. τ(w) = i means that the model
(Sw,Rw,aw,hw) is a model inKi, we use Wi to denote the set of worlds of type i;
– F, is the set of fibring functionsF : I×W 7→W. A fibring functionF is a function
giving for each i and each w ∈W another point (actual world) in W as follows:
Fi(w) =
{
w if w ∈ Sm and m ∈Ki
a value in Wi, otherwise
such that if x 6= y thenFi(x) 6=Fi(y).
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Satisfaction is defined as follows with the usual truth tables for boolean connectives:
t |= p iff h(t, p) = 1, where p is an atom
t |=2iA iff
{
t ∈m and m ∈Ki and ∀s(tRs→ s |= A),or
t ∈m, andm 6∈Ki and ∀F ∈ F,Fi(t) |=2iA.
We say the model satisfies A iff w0 |= A.
A fibred model for LFI can be generated from fibring the semantics for the modal
logics Li, i ∈ I. The detailed construction runs as follows: Let Ki be a class of models
{mi1,mi2, . . .} for which Li is complete. Each model min has the form (S,R,a,h). The
actual world a plays a role in the semantic evaluation in the model, in so far as satisfac-
tion in the model is defined as satisfaction at a. We can assume that the models satisfy
the condition S= {x | ∃n a Rnx}. This assumption does not affect satisfaction in models
because points not accessible from a by any power Rn of R do not affect truth values at
a. Moreover we assume that all sets of possible worlds in any Ki are all pairwise dis-
joint, and that there are infinitely many isomorphic (but disjoint) copies of each model
in Ki. We use the notation m for a model and present it as m = (Sm,Rm,am,hm) and
write m ∈Ki, when the model m is in the semantics Ki. Thus our assumption boils
down to m 6= n⇒ Sm ∩ Sn = ∅. In fact a model can be identified by its actual world,









– h(w,q) = hm(w,q), for the uniquem such that w ∈ Sm;
– aw = am for the unique m such that w ∈ Sm.
Dovetailing Dovetailing is a special case of fibring in the sense that the dovetailed
model must agree with the current world on the values of atoms. For instance, in the
previous section we saw that the functions F can be viewed as functions giving for
each t ∈ S1 ∪ S2, an element F (t) ∈ S1 ∪ S2 such that if t ∈ Si then F (t) ∈ S j, i 6= j.
If L1 and L2 share the same set of atoms Q then we can compare the values h(t,q) and
h(F (t),q) for an atom q which need not be identical. If we require from the fibring
functions that for each t ∈ Si,F j(t) ∈ S j and each q ∈ Q we want
h(t,q) = h(Fi(t),q).
Then this fibring case is referred to as dovetailing. This means that the actual world of
the model fibred at t,Fi(t), can be identified with t. The set of fibring functions F is no
longer needed, since we identified t withFi(t), for every fibring functionF .
Definition 2 [5] Let Li be modal logics, withKi the class of models for Li. Let LDI (the
dovetailing combination of Li, i ∈ I) be defined semantically through the class of all
(dovetailed) models of the form (W, R, a, h), where W is a set of worlds, a ∈W, h is an
assignment and for each i ∈ I,R(i)⊆W ×W. We require that for each i, (W,R(i),a,h)
is a model inKi. It is further required that all t ∈W be such that there exist n1, . . . ,nk
and i1, . . . , ik such that aRn1(i1)◦Rn2(i2) · · · ◦Rnk(ik)t holds. The satisfaction condition
w |= A, is defined by induction as
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– w |= q if w ∈ h(q) for q atomic;
– w |=2iA if for all y ∈W, such that wR(i)y we have y |= A;
– |= A iff for all models and actual worlds a |= A.
Two theorems are given below, the proof of which can be found in [5].
Theorem 1 (Dovetailing and Normal Modal Logic). Assume Li, i ∈ I all are exten-
sions of K formulated using traditional Hilbert axioms and the rule of necessitation,
then LDI can be axiomatized by taking the union of the axioms and the rules of necessi-
tation for each modality 2i of each Li
Theorem 2 (Fibring = Dovetailing). If Li, i ∈ I admit necessitation and satisfy the
disjunction property, then LFI = L
D
I .
It is immediate to see that BDI logic without interaction axioms is nothing else but
normal multi-modal logics —combinations of normal modal logics (e.g., the basic BDI
logic proposed in [15] is the combination of a KD45 modality for BEL, KD for GOAL
and KD for INT)— hence, according to Theorem 1, dovetailing provides a general
methodology for generating BDI-like systems.
4 Semantics for Mental States
In the previous section we have seen how to provide a general semantics for BDI logics
without interaction of modalities. However, mental states are very often connected to
each other, for example the interaction axioms like (1) and (2); thus what is needed is
a methodology to capture them. In this section we use Catach approach [2] to extend
dovetailing in order to develop a general semantics that covers both the basic modalities
and their interactions. Briefly Catach’s approach runs as follows:
Let I be a set of atomic labels; complex labels can be built from atomic ones using
the neutral element “λ”, the sequential operator “;”, and the union operator “∪”. If i is
an atomic label and α a well-formed formula, then the expression [i]α corresponds to
the modal formula 2iα , and 〈i〉α to 3iα . Furthermore we assume that [λ ] = 〈λ 〉. The
transformation of complex labels into modalities is governed by the following rules:
[λ ]α ⇔ α; [a;b]α ⇔ [a][b]α; [a∪b]α ⇔ [a]α ∧ [b]α.
According to the above conditions we can identify, for example, the formula 2122A∧
23A∧A with the expression [(1;2)∪3∪λ ].
Let us consider now the expression 〈a〉[b]α ⇒ [c]〈d〉α , known as the a,b,c,d-
incestuality axiom (we will use Ga,b,c,d to refer to it). It can be used to generate, among
others, the well know D, T , B, 4 and 5 axioms of modal logic. For example, when
a= b= λ and c= d = 1 we obtain the symmetry axiom B for 2i.
It is then immediate to see that the above axiom schema covers many existing sys-
tems of multi-modal logic, including the BDI system and make the generation of a large
class of new ones possible.
Example 1. Let α be a formula and BEL, GOAL, INT, CAP, OPP and RES be the
modal operators for the mental constructs; then the following are instances of Ga,b,c,d .
204 Guido Governatori Vineet Padmanabhan Abdul Sattar
C1 GOAL(α)⇒ BEL(α) (Inclusion)
C2 INT(α)⇒{GOAL(α)⇒ BEL(α)} (Relative Inclusion)
C3 RES(e)⇔ CAP(e)∧OPP(e) (Union)
The axioms C2 and C3 are possible additions to the existing BDI axioms. The above
axioms (as well as others) can be used to represent various concepts such as rational
agents, programs, actions etc. For instance C2 captures the fact that an agent’s intention
to achieve α is supported by having a goal towards α and this goal is based on its belief
of α . The existing BDI framework lacks such axioms.
As far as dovetailed models are concerned it is possible to define a mapping ρ
between labels and the accessibility relations of dovetailed models.
Definition 3 Let a and b be labels, i an atomic label, and (W,R(i),a,h) a dovetailed
model. Then
ρ(i) = R(i); ρ(λ ) = ∆ ; ρ(a;b) = ρ(a)|ρ(b); ρ(a∪b) = ρ(a)∪ρ(b);
where the operators ∪ (union) and | (composition) are defined for binary relations, and
∆ is the diagonal relation over W
Definition 4 Let a, b, c, and d be labels. A dovetailed model D= (W,R(i),a,h) enjoys
the a,b,c,d-incestuality property iff the following condition holds for D.
ρ(a)−1|ρ(c)⊆ ρ(b)|ρ(d)−1.
The incestuality condition can be reformulated as follows:
If (w,w′) ∈ ρ(a) and (w,w′′) ∈ ρ(c) then there exists w′′′ such that (w′,w′′′) ∈
ρ(b) and (w′′,w′′′) ∈ ρ(d).
Theorem 3. [2] Let LBDI be a normal multi-modal system built from a finite set of
axioms Ga,b,c,d . Then LBDI is determined by the class of dovetailed models satisfying
the a,b,c,d-incestuality properties.
Catach originally proved the above theorem for what he calls multi-frames. Trivially
multi-frames correspond to dovetailed models. In particular this result provides the
characterization of a wide class of interaction axioms such as the relationships among
mental attitudes of rational agents in terms of dovetailing.
5 Conditions on the Fibring Function
Section 3 establishes how BDI-like systems (without interaction axioms) can be recon-
structed using dovetailing and section 4 introduces a general axiom schema through
which we can generate a range of BDI-like interaction axioms. In this section we
demonstrate with the help of an example what conditions would be required on the fib-
ring functions in order to cope with the a,b,c,d-incestuality schema. As noted earlier
we assume that the combination of two complete logics need not be complete when we
include interaction axioms. We want to identify conditions under which completeness
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can be preserved. But before identifying the specific conditions on the fibring func-
tions we need to introduce certain notions and constructions related to completeness
preservation in terms of canonical models and canonical logics.
In the canonical model construction a world is a maximal consistent sets of wff.
Thus for any normal propositional modal system S, its canonical model 〈W,R,V 〉 is
defined as follows:
– W = {w: w is a maximal S-consistent set of wff };
– For any pair of worlds w and any w′ ∈W , wRw′ iff {α :2α ∈ w} ⊆ w′;
– For any variable p and any w ∈W , V (p,w) = 1 iff p ∈ w.
But in the case of a fibred model the above construction needs to be modified ac-
cordingly as follows: Let Li, i ∈ I be monomodal normal logic with languages Li. Let
ML be the set of all L-maximal consistent sets of formula. Given a set S of formulas,
L2i(S) = {A :2iA ∈ S} and LLi(S) = {A : A=2iB or A=3iB,A ∈ S}. The canonical
model for LFI ,C
F
I is the structure 〈W,S,R,F,a,τ,h〉, where
– W =ML× I.
– S is a functionW 7→℘W such that Sw = {(x, i) ∈W : τ(w) = i}. In other words the
set of worlds of the same type as w.
– Rw ⊆ Sw×Sw such that xRwy iff L2τ(w)(x)⊆ y.
– F is the set of functionsF : I×W 7→W (fibring functions) such that
Fi,(x, j) =
 (x, j) i= j(x, i) x= aw(y, i) otherwise
where LLi(x) ⊆ y, and if x 6= y, thenFi(x) 6=F j(y).
– aw = w.
– τ(x, i) = i
– h(p,w) = 1 iff p ∈ w, for p atomic.
Lemma 1. For every formula α and every world w in the canonical model
h(w,α) = 1 iff α ∈ w.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of α . The only difference with the
proof of the monomodal case is when α = 2iβ and τ(w) 6= i. If h(w,2iβ ) = 1, then
for every F ∈ F h(Fi(w),2iβ ) = 1, and we can apply the standard construction for
modalities and we obtain that 2iβ ∈Fi(w). Let us now suppose that 2iβ is not in w.
Since w is maximal ¬2iβ ∈ w; thus 3i¬β ∈ w. LLi ⊆Fi(w), hence 3i¬β ∈Fi(w),
from which we derive a contradiction. Thus 2iβ ∈ w. The other direction is similar.
As an immediate consequence of the Lemma we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. LFI ` α iff CFI |= α .
Definition 5 Let FL be the frame of the canonical model for L. L is canonical iff for
every valuation V , (FL,V ) is a model for L.
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Clearly the above definition is equivalent to the usual condition for a modal logic to be
canonical (i.e., that the frame of the canonical model is a frame for L). However the
fibring construction inherits the valuation functions from the underlying models, and
we can obtain different logics imposing conditions on the fibring functions based on
the assignments of the variables. The fibred frame forL1,2 is obtained in the same way
as the fibred model, replacing the occurrences of models with frames.
Lemma 2. Let MFI = (W,S,R,F,a,τ,h) be the canonical model for LFI . Then for each
w ∈W (Sw,Rw,hw) is the canonical model for τ(w).
Proof. By inspection on the construction of the canonical model for LFI .
From the above Lemma we obtain:
Theorem 5. Let Li, i ∈ I be canonical monomodal logics. Then LFI is canonical.
For instance the inclusion axiom 21A⇒22A is characterized by the dovetailed models
where R2 ⊆ R1. However, such a constraint would be meaningless for fibred models
where each modality has its own set of possible worlds. So, what is the corresponding
condition on fibred models? A fibring function is defined as
F : I×W →W
where I is the set of modalities involved andW is a set of possible worlds. It is worth
noting that given a world we can identify the model it belongs to, and that there is a
bijection M between the actual worlds and their models. So to deal with the inclusion
axiom the following constraint must be satisfied:
∀w ∈W∀F ∈ F :M(F2(w))vN M(F1(w)) (5)
where vN is the inclusion morphism thus defined:
Definition 6 Let m1 and m2 be two models. Then m2 vN m1 iff there is a morphism
w :W2 7→W1, such that
– for each atom p, h2(w, p) = h1(w(w), p);
– if xR2y then w(x)R1w(y).
The constraint on the fibring functions to support the inclusion axiom, is in alliance with
the incestuality axiom Ga,b,c,d as stated in the previous section, that is, R2 = ρ(c) and
R1 = ρ(b). The incestuality axiom can be characterised by giving appropriate condi-
tions that identify the (fibred) models m1 and m2 involved in the inclusion morphism.
It is now possible to provide a characterization of the fibring/dovetailing of normal
modal logics L1 and L2 with inclusion axiom (i.e., 21α ⇒22α).
Theorem 6. Let L1 and L2 be two canonical normal modal logics and let L1,2 be the
logics obtained by fibring/dovetailing L1 and L2. Then L1,2⊕21α ⇒ 22α is charac-
terized by the class of fibred/dovetailed models satisfying (5).
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Proof. For the proof we have to note that, thanks to the fact that L1 and L2 are canonical,
for any pair of world w and v, the sets of maximal consistent associated with them are
the same, i.e., Sw = Sv, they are the set of all the maximal consistent sets. Thus no
matter of the fibring function we chose, we have that the structure of the the models
obtained from F1 and F2 are the same. Therefore we can use the identity over ML
as the morphism w in the inclusion morphism. Let m1 = F1(w) and m2 = F2(w).
Clearly for every world v and every atom p, h2(v, p) = h1(w(v), p). Since 21A⇒ 22A
is an axiom, then ∀w ∈W , 21A⇒ 22A ∈ w. This implies L21(w) ⊆ L22(w). Hence if
wR2y, then L22(w) ⊆ y. Since the morphism w is the identity over ML, we have that
L21(w(w))⊆ L22(w(w))⊆ w(y). Therefore w(w)R1w(y).
It is well known that normal modal operators have certain properties that are occasion-
ally considered undesirable for the common sense notions that they are intended to for-
malise. For instance the property of Logical Omniscience though could hold for the be-
liefs of an agent is certainly undesirable for the knowledge part. For example to say that
an agent knows all the logical consequences of its knowledge (2ϕ∧2(ϕ⇒ψ))⇒2ψ
is to live in an idealized world. The fibring methodology can be used to combine single
modal logics that are not normal. However, in general, simple adjustments are required
to deal with classes of non-normal modal logics. In what follows we show the mod-
ifications required for quasi-normal modal logics (i.e. modal logics containing K and
closed under RM ` α ⇒ β/ ` 2α ⇒ 2β ). The first thing we have to consider is that
the structure of models appropriate for such a class is (W,N,R,a,h) whereW and a are
as usual, N ⊆W (representing the set of normal worlds), R ⊆ N×W , and we have the
following two additional clauses on the valuation function h:
if w /∈ N,h(w,2α) = 0; if w /∈ N,h(w,3α) = 1.
Fibred, dovetailed, and canonical models can be obtained accordingly with the appro-
priate trivial modifications (cf. [10]).3 We are now ready to give the completeness the-
orem for the fibring of monotonic modal logics.
Theorem 7. Let Li, i ∈ I be quasi-normal modal logics classes of structuresKi and set
of theorems Ti. Let TFI be the following set of wffs of L
F
I .
1. Ti ⊆ TFI , for every i ∈ I;
2. If A(xm) ∈ Ti then A(xm/2 jα j) ∈ TFI , for any 2iαm, i ∈ I;
3. Monotonic Modal Fibring Rule: If 2i is the modality of Li and 2 j that of L j,










4. TFI is the smallest set closed under 1, 2, 3, modus ponens and substitution.
Then TFI is the set of all wffs of L
F
I valid in all the fibred monotonic structures of L
F
I .
Proof. The proof is a trivial modification of that of Theorem 3.10 of [5].
3 For normal modal logics N =W , thus any normal modal logic is also quasi-normal.
208 Guido Governatori Vineet Padmanabhan Abdul Sattar
Intuitively the meaning of the Monotonic Modal Fibring Rule has to do with the substi-
tutions of formulas of one language into a formula of the other language. If the substi-
tuted formulas are proof theoretically related we want to propagate this relation to the
other language. Moreover there are formal similarities between the Monotonic Fibred
Rule and RM. Consider an implication of the form A⇒ B where A and B are built from
atoms of the form 2iC. There our special RM says that if ` A⇒ B then we can derive
`2 jA⇒2 jB for any modality 2 j other than 2i.
A similar theorem can be proved for the dovetailing of quasi-normal modal logics
with the appropriate modifications on the Dovetail Modal Rule given by Gabbay [5].
At this stage we have to revise our definition of inclusion morphism.
Definition 7 Letm1 and m2 be two quasi-normal models. m1 vM m2 iff
1. m1 vN m2; and
2. if w /∈ N1 then w(w) /∈ N2.
Theorem 8. Let L1 and L2 be the logic obtained by the canonical quasi-normal modal
logic fibring/dovetailing of L1 and L2. Then LM1,2⊕21α ⇒22α is characterized by the
class of fibred/dovetailed models satisfying
∀w ∈W∀F ∈ F :M(F2(w))vM M(F1(w)).
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 6.
The main consequence of the above theorem is that it shows how to extend the full
power of fibring to non-normal modal logics with interaction axioms, including combi-
nations of a range of modalities required to model complex BDI systems.
Corollary 1. Let L1 and L2 be the logic obtained by the canonical {quasi-}normal
modal logic fibring/dovetailing of L1 and L2. Then LM1,2⊕21α ⇒22α is canonical.
6 Discussion
We have investigated the relationships between BDI logics and Gabbay’s fibring se-
mantics. In particular we have shown how to reconstruct the logical account of BDI
in terms of dovetailing and Catach’s approach. Roughly fibring (dovetailing) examines
and develops each single operator on its own, within its own semantics, and then the
operators and models are glued together to form a comprehensive system.
The proposed methodology provides a general framework for BDI in so far as it
is not restricted to particular operators and, at the same time, it offers easy tools to
study properties (e.g., soundness, completeness, . . . ) of the resulting systems. Transfer
results, even if limited to very small cases of interaction axioms, would be of extreme
importance to BDI theorists as this will help shift their attention from the single case
analysis to the general problem of combination of mental states. The problem of inter-
action axioms between logic fragments in a combined logic might become more central
among the BDI theorists. Moreover the proposed approach is not restricted to normal
modal operators —the use of non-normal epistemic operators is one of the common
strategies to (partially) obviate the problem of logical omniscience.
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As we have seen dovetailing is a particular form of fibring, and the latter offers a
more fine grained analysis of the concepts at hand. In other words we can say that fib-
ring is more selective than dovetailing. Indeed, there are formulas which are valid under
dovetailing but false under some interpretations using fibring; thus some unwanted con-
sequences could be discarded by fibring. Remember that the condition for dovetailing
states that sources and targets of the fibring functions agree on the evaluation of atoms.
However, this is not required for fibring, so, we can say that fibring can be thought of
as a change of perspective in passing from a model (modal operator) to another model
(modal operator). This has some important consequences: for example, the interpreta-
tion of a piece of evidence may depend on the mental state used to look at it.
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